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ABSTRACT
Discussion on the using of insider information in the process of implementation of 
corporate governance is important not only for Russia, but also for those countries 
which have the laws governing this activity not for the fi rst year. This article is de-
voted to the review of legislation governing the activities with the using of insider 
information. Similar legislation operates in countries with a long history of their use, 
in particular the United States, France, Great Britain, and in states where the law in 
question is relatively recent (these countries are Germany, Russia). The main atten-
tion is paid to the special status of subjects of the prosecution, because the defi nition 
of insider information in the legislation of different countries does not cause serious 
diffi culties and varies to a greater extent the formal features, but it cannot be said 
about what the defi nition given by the insider is.
1. INTRODUCTION
“Insider trading” is a term that most investors have heard and usually associate 
with illegal conduct. But the term actually includes both legal and illegal con-
duct. The legal version is when corporate insiders — offi cers, directors, and 
employees — buy and sell stock in their own companies.
By 2000, the fi nancial market existed in 103 countries, in 87 of them passed a 
law regulating the activities with the use of insider information. It’s no secret 
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that most European countries have adopted this law in the last decade of the 
last century as a result of the changes taking place in the global economy and 
the global fi nancial market. For example, Germany adopted a law on insider 
information as one of the last member-countries of the European Union, pri-
marily guided by the desire to strengthen the position of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange as a leading fi nancial center in continental Europe and improve the 
country’s reputation with attractive fi nancial climate.
Globalization of the world economy and fi nancial markets more noticeable 
highlights the need to harmonize the legal regulation of these processes. The 
European Union has made signifi cant progress in this direction through the 
legislation related to insider activity in the territory of the European Union. 
The Directive on Insider Dealing is a vivid example.
Development of new technologies and the use of the internet have made the 
world fi nancial markets more accessible to investors. At the same time, this 
mobility facilitates unscrupulous investors the opportunity to evade responsi-
bility for the committed offence. Such offences associated with the use of in-
sider information activity are no exception. Therefore, joint efforts of countries 
to identify unscrupulous investors are particularly important.
At present, Russia does not use its full potential to attract investment. Lack 
of adequate legal regulation of using insider information has bad infl uence 
on the investment attractiveness of the country. Of course, the adoption of a 
law on insider information1 solved some of the problems faced by investors in 
fi nancial markets, but certainly at the moment is necessary to adopt additional 
measures that will enhance the country’s status. 
2.  RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF INSIDER INFORMATION -
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
It is obvious that the law of any country has its own characteristics, due to its 
economic, historical and cultural development. This in turn affects not only 
the details of the legislation, but also the process of its development. For exam-
ple, in the European Union, Australia and Japan adopted legislation specifi cal-
ly aimed at regulating exactly insider activity. At the same time, the US laws 
governing insider activity are the result of administrative and judicial interpre-
tation of the rules governing fraud and deceit. This difference makes US law 
more dynamic and fl exible to all ‘unusual’ situations using insider information 
1  The Federal Law of 27.07.2010 N 224-FZ “On combating unauthorized use of insider 
information and market manipulation and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation.” “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, N 168, 30.07.2010.
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arising in the fi nancial market. Despite the possible differences, the main pro-
visions of legislative acts are similar in substance and could be successfully 
used in making laws in the countries where such standards are absent.
3.  WHAT INFORMATION RECOGNIZED INSIDER
Review of the legislation of countries with developed fi nancial market has 
shown that the nature of the information used in stock transactions, is a key 
feature for which the law classifi es it in the category of insider. Thus, the laws 
of all countries surveyed previously contain two attributes for which informa-
tion is deemed insider: information must be relevant, meaningful and acces-
sible to a wide range of investors. Despite the resemblance of these features, 
interpretations are sometimes different.
For the law of the European countries it is common that the defi nition of insid-
er information has two main requirements: the information must be relevant so 
that may impact the market value of the shares, and is not available to a wide 
range of investors.
Japanese legislation devoted formal side of the issue to defi ning value. For 
example, Japanese law does not contain a clear statement of what information 
is necessary to recognize the insider, and provides a list of facts on non-dis-
closure of which involves responsibility for the use of this information2. Ac-
cording to the law, corporation in the manner prescribed by law shall disclose 
information concerning its activities, if it contains facts, included in the list 
of law subject to mandatory disclosure. The Corporation is required to follow 
these requirements even if these facts are already known to interested inves-
tors3.
The US law governing insider activity is not integral law, as in most of coun-
tries, but the set of regulations and judicial decisions, which lacks a clear state-
ment of what information deemed insider. Nevertheless, in practice, there is 
the concept of judicial ‘essential, important information’ that is widely used 
by judges in deciding guilt of person for use of the information in transactions 
with shares.
Sometimes there is the external similarity of the approaches of the laws of 
different countries as to what information is considered insider. It is diffi cult 
to determine when publicly available information has to be recognized as sig-
2  Tomoko Akashi. Note. Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1296. 
1989.
3  Ibid
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nifi cant, so that its use will be grounds for bringing a person to justice. In the 
United States and Australia is applied a broader interpretation of the concept 
‘substantial’. For example, in the United States is recognized the importance 
of information, which is essential if the average investor expects that this in-
formation may affect the stock price changes4.
A similar approach to the concept of ‘substantial’ is used in Australian law. 
It recognizes the essential information as such, when from the point of view 
of the average investor can affect the price of the shares or his decision to 
purchase/sale shares5. The presence in the formulation of the valuation con-
cepts as ‘the decision to buy / sell shares’, sets it apart from all the others and 
provides an additional opportunity for loose interpretation of the facts by both 
parties. 
European Union legislation, at fi rst glance, gives a more detailed defi nition 
of material information, although, in fact, it is not much different from the 
language used in the legislation of other countries. Thus, according to the defi -
nition of ‘signifi cant’ is information that is accurate. It refers to the issuer or 
directly to the shares and can signifi cantly affect the price of traded securities6. 
This defi nition raises doubts about the desirability of the requirement to ensure 
that the information necessarily apply to the Issuer or the shares directly. Is 
someone going to buy or sell shares, using the information without any relation 
to this transaction?
The differences in the wording of such signifi cant responsibility for regulating 
the concept of ‘essential information’ may have different consequences. For 
instance, the Japanese law, with its limited list of facts to be disclosed, en-
ables the person concerned to select a more fl exible behavior in the handling 
of information. In turn, the standard approaches are based on the behavior 
of the average investor, resulting in greater predictability of who can be held 
accountable.
Giving advice on what defi nition of insider information may be most appro-
priate for the Russian legislation regulating insider activity, it is important to 
include the following key requirements:
1. the information must contain undisclosed information which at the request 
of the legislator must be disclosed to a wide range of investors;
4  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224. 1988.
5  Corporations Act. 1998. § 1002C. 1002G(1)(a) (Austl.); Ampolex, Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee 
Co., Ltd., 1996 NSW LEXIS 2827.
6  Council Directive 89/592 of November 13, 1989; Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
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2. information should be of such nature that their disclosure may affect the 
market value of the securities.
4. WHO CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR USE OF INSIDER 
INFORMATION?
If the defi nition of ‘inside information’ in the legislation of different countries 
does not cause serious diffi culties although varies to a greater extent, the same 
cannot be said about the defi nition given by insiders. It affects primarily the 
concept of the underlying rules governing insider activity. One of the basic 
theories is the concept of information asymmetry. Its essence lies in the fact 
that one side of the transaction, having more information about the subject of 
the transaction, is aware that the other side of the same transaction would not 
participate in it, if it had more information because the transaction is consid-
ered to be unfair.  
If you do not talk about the moral aspect of the transaction where one party 
simply cheating in relation to the other, from the point of view of the theory 
of economic effi ciency of the transaction, which simply moves the wealth of 
uninformed side to well-informed side, is a bargain with zero effi ciency. Both 
sides benefi t more from the deal if the information is provided to both parties. 
Awareness that someone would be likely a victim of an unfair bargain reduc-
es interest in investment, which in turn makes the elusive goal of creating an 
attractive fi nancial market with high liquidity. It is diffi cult to dispute the fact, 
that the information itself is valuable, if nothing else for the time spent, to get 
it. Directors and employees have access to internal information of the compa-
ny - which is not open to other investors - primarily due to the performance of 
their duties. In other words, their privileged position in relation to other inves-
tors is not the result of further analytical work, than due to the fact that these 
people ‘were’ in the right place at the right time. Although the use of word 
‘were’ is not entirely correct, because these people by virtue of their offi cial 
duties had to have this information. 
Against the background of the above use of the theory of equal access to in-
formation that is used as a basis of liability in the Australian legislation is 
justifi ed7. Some of the diffi culties of this theory are related to the uncertainty 
of the concept of ‘equal access’. Analytical skills of one person may largely 
differ from the abilities of other people; other things being in equal conditions 
7  Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations Relating to Tender Offers 
and Insider Trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, 66 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1133, 1148-1149. 1998.
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can lead to a completely opposite decision. This situation has a right to exist, 
if both participants in transaction are initially in the same conditions of access 
to the information. If one party in the transaction, using the preferential ac-
cess, uses the additional information in the decision and the other party does 
not have more information, then there is a violation of the principle of equal 
access, which implies an offensive liability.
In the Australian legislation, this problem is solved by limiting the liability 
only for those cases where the violation of the principle of equal access to 
information is clear, and there is no legal justifi cation for the use of insider 
information without disclosure. 
The European legislation offers an alternative to its use of the theory of equal 
access. Thus, Directive on Insider Dealing provides for liability of directors, 
shareholders and other persons who possess inside information, basing on the 
fact that these individuals perform their offi cial or professional duties. The 
rationality of this approach is due to the fact that it is in this group of people 
more likely to be involved in the transaction with the use of insider informa-
tion. So, it can be concluded that such a non-specifi c defi nition of the concept 
‘insider’ is related to the small number of transactions that have been made 
possible due to other reasons than the violation of the principle of equal access 
to information. 
At fi rst glance, the approach to the regulation of insider activity in the US, 
which is also built on the theory of equal access, not much different from the 
approach taken in the European Union. However, in the United States is not 
enough the fact that a person has or, on the contrary, has not access to the 
information. The basis for the prosecution can be a silent person, if it is equiv-
alent to the silence of the misrepresentation, which in turn escalates to a viola-
tion of key provisions of the US corporate law that directors, top managers of 
the companies, as fi duciaries of shareholders are required to justify such trust8.
The decision of the US Supreme Court in the case Chiarella, best demon-
strates the features of accountability for the use of insider information in the 
United States. Chiarella worked in an organization that provides services to 
fi nancial companies. Among his clients were companies in whose intention 
was to bid buy off shares of the several companies at the price higher than the 
market. 
Despite the fact that the client-company left empty graph with the name of 
the company whose shares is going to buy, the documents were for printing. 
8  Shirinyan I. World experience of using insider information on the securities market // 
RZB. 2004. No 13. p. 38-42.
81
M. I. Shunevich: Liability for use of insider information in the framework of corporate governance: a comparative...
Chiarella using information from other documents guessed of which company 
shares will be the subject of transaction, and bought shares worth about 30 
thousand dollars prior to the announcement of transaction. SEC found this 
deal, and Chiarella was prosecuted for violation of the norms stipulated by 
Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-59. The Supreme Court reversed verdict of the 
lower court and acquitted Chiarella9. So, the different solutions were due to the 
different approaches. In accordance to the rules of procedure before verdict the 
judge must instruct the jury on which key points should be based their deci-
sion. In the case of Chiarella judge recommended that the jurors pay attention 
to the fact that the perpetrator when buying shares used material information 
not disclosed to the wide range of investors, and thus knew that the other mar-
ket participants did not have access to this information. The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court decision, noting that in the case of application of the 
theory, Chiarella’s equal access to the information was wrong. The Supreme 
Court based his decision on the fact that insider has primarily trusting relation-
ship with the shareholders of the company, of which he is an employee. In this 
case, Chiarella was not insider of the company whose shares he acquired, and 
moreover he did not obtain the information from the insider.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Chiarella, in the sense of require-
ments of the US corporate law, had no obligations toward the company and 
its shareholders. Thus, according to the Australian and European legislation 
Chiarella was not guilty, and could not be held responsible for the misuse 
of information received by chance. The difference lies in the same Elaborate 
American legislation on the use of insider information, as a consequence of the 
important role played by fi nancial markets in the United States. 
With regard to bringing to justice those who have received information from 
insiders, according to the rule of equal access to information in its interpreta-
tion any Australian person possessing substantial range of undisclosed infor-
mation from investors, are not allowed participating in deal. In the legislation 
of the countries of the European Union there is also a clear position, which 
prohibits secondary insiders make transactions10 and adheres to the regula-
tions, that any person, who has received information from an insider, automat-
ically assumes the obligation not to commit insider transaction. In accordance 
with the laws of Japan, in addition to traditional quasi insiders liable for the 
use of inside information may be held entities affi liated companies, as well as 
civil servants who have received insider information as a result of the business 
relationship with the company. 
9  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222. 1980.
10  Shirinyan I. World experience of using insider information on the securities market // 
RZB. 2004. No 10. p. 74.
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The jurisprudence of the United States has the most detailed approach to the 
question of guilt of a person who is not an insider. So, signifi cant is the case 
Dirks, who was the fi nancial analyst of brokerage house11. Secrist, the for-
mer employee of the fi nancial companies Equity Funding, told Dirks about 
large-scale fraud plot in the company, where he previously worked, hoping that 
Dirks, because of his professional duties, would reveal this fraud scheming. 
Dirks has warned its client’s brokerage fi rm about this fraud, which allowed 
them to get rid of the shares of Equity Funding before information about the 
machinations became widely known.
Despite the fact that the SEC considered Dirks guilty of distributing insider 
information to clients of brokerage company (which allowed them to sell the 
shares before the drop in price), the Supreme Court reversed the decision, cit-
ing the fact that only an insider has obligation to disclose information to the 
commission for transactions. At the same time, in the case O’Hagan Supreme 
Court issued decision that the lower-level managers, as well as other employees 
of the company, although not having access to confi dential information, but 
have such various reasons and use it to generate income in the transaction with 
company’s shares will be found guilty of violating the trust of his employer12. 
Further development of jurisprudence in the United States and the emergence 
of the theory ‘misappropriation of information’13 demurred the approaches in 
European and American law in bringing to justice those who are not insiders 
in the classic sense.
The Russian legislation has also need to distinguish two groups of persons 
who may be held liable for insider activity - the direct insiders and the persons 
in possession of insider information. As ‘insiders’ should be included persons 
who have access to insider information by virtue of their offi cial or profession-
al duties. To the persons in possession of the insider information should be 
included all those who actually own the insider information.
5. ACTIVITIES REGULATED BY LEGISLATION ON INSIDER 
ACTIVITY
Defi ning ‘actions using insider information is unlawful’, does not cause too 
much trouble, and is similar in the legislation of different countries. Thus, it is 
generally accepted that a person has no right to make transactions with securi-
11  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646. 1983.
12  United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199. 1997.
13  Shirinyan I. World experience of using insider information on the securities market // 
RZB. 2004. No 13. p. 38.
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ties using insider information. The differences begin with the fact that in some 
countries, such as the United States and the European Union, to be considered 
as illegitimate it is necessary that person not just owned information but also 
use it in the transaction. In Austria and Japan, on the contrary, to prosecute 
someone is enough that he/she only possess the inside information, which au-
tomatically implies its use in the transaction. 
It is more complicated to deal with bringing to the justice insiders who for-
warded insider information to third parties. Under the Australian law a person 
is subject to law suit for transfer of insider information to any third party, if 
the person who transmits the information knew or should have known that the 
third party will use this information to buy or sell securities. Japanese law is 
more loyal and provides for liability for the transmission of information only 
for insiders.
In accordance to the US law of the prosecution, it is important to establish the 
fact of material interest of the person who sent the information. The legislation 
of the European Union, as a rule, does not request liability for the transmission 
of information by the quasi-insiders. If insider has passed the information, it 
would be the basis for liability. The laws regulating insider activity have in 
common the presence of personal intent in action or awareness of using insider 
information when making transactions in securities. 
The Russian law governing insider activity can serve as a prototype for the 
Australian model of accountability for the use of insider information. Accord-
ing to this model, the person will be persecuted based on ownership of infor-
mation, as well as for the transfer of insider information to any third party, if 
the person who transmits the information knew or should have known that 
the third party will use this information to buy or sell securities. Intent or 
awareness in the use of insider information must also be a prerequisite bring 
the person to justice.
6. FEATURES OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS IN THE JOINT 
RUSSIAN MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Russian corporate law is still not resolved the issues of using insider in-
formation. Meanwhile, the stock market takes a regular manipulation of stock 
prices. According to the Federal Law “On the Securities Market”, the circle of 
persons possessing inside information is quite narrow and does not cover, for 
example, members of the Board of Directors and the Audit Commission, the 
major shareholders. Currently, the Federal Law “is combating unauthorized 
use of insider information and market manipulation”. It provides a clear defi ni-
tion of “insider information”, as well as a list of securities in respect to which it 
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is possible to use the service information, introduces a number of restrictions 
on its use, expanding the circle of insiders due to the inclusion of not only the 
company offi cials, but also the public employees who have access to the data-
base of the issuer.
The main priority of the Russian legislature at this stage is to establish a clear 
legal framework for the settlement of corporate confl icts, the creation of civi-
lized mechanisms of mergers, acquisitions and reorganization of the company, 
defi ne the criteria for affi liation, the regulation of the use of insider infor-
mation. In other words, clearing the “platform” for the formation of a favor-
able external environment, without which, for the country aspiring to the full-
fl edged system of corporate governance, that is hardly possible.
April 18, 2014 Bank of Russia Bulletin submitted information intended for 
joint-stock companies, public corporations and companies that: “on March 21, 
2014 Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia approved the Corporate Gov-
ernance Code (hereinafter - the Code). The Code recommends that the Bank 
of Russia to the use of joint-stock companies, whose securities are admitted to 
organized trading. Additionally, we have to inform that the draft Code of Cor-
porate Governance was approved, mainly by referring to the recommendation, 
at a government meeting February 13, 2014 “.
The Code was approved by the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia, and 
was fully approved, when the Bank of Russia in a letter from 04.10.2014, rec-
ommends the Code for public joint stock company. It was reported, that at a 
meeting of the Russian Government 02/13/2014 Code “was approved mainly 
with the reference to his advisory nature.”
In this connection, in our opinion, is the unresolved question of how much 
of the code is outside the “approved in principle“, meaning that is not fully 
approved by the Russian Government. It is also unclear why the Code rec-
ommended by the Bank of Russia to the full application of the Company’s 
shareholders, was recommended as “substantially”. These issues become even 
more relevant by giving the mandatory status of the Code, to implement the 
document in a number of state-owned companies. And in the light of the in-
formation, that are now being discussed plans for  “implementation” (that is, in 
our view, the obligation) of the Code for all Russian public companies, these 
issues cannot continue to be unclear. The Code currently is the largest paper 
of its kind in the world, but most of the provisions of the Code is declarative 
in nature.
Since 2014 the Code was by judicial practice interpreted as a custom of busi-
ness practice. Currently, the authorization of acts or decisions are clearly out-
side of the custom that may be, for example, the basis for recognition of the 
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decision of the board of directors of the company as invalid. This Code sets 
a certain standard of conduct, where a clear deviation would allow the court 
to protect the interests of the person (a shareholder, a member of the Board of 
Directors).
7.  COOPERATION AMONG INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
Insider trading often crosses borders: a foreign citizen engaged in insider trad-
ing on the domestic market; nationals affect insider trade through the foreign 
accounts; or important evidence of domestic insider trading lies outside do-
mestic borders. 
Successful investigations and prosecutions of these cases require international 
cooperation. Perhaps one of the most progressive aspects of the EC Directive 
is, that it requires of the members to cooperate with each other “whenever nec-
essary for the purpose of carrying out their duties” in connection with the EC 
Directive. The signifi cant benefi t of this provision is that it requires no further 
agreements between or among states regarding cooperation. 
The SEC has entered into 32 arrangements with foreign counterparts for in-
formation sharing and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of 
securities law violations. These agreements have taken primarily two forms: 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Criminal Matters and Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
The United States have entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with 
numerous countries, including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Cayman 
Islands, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, the Bahamas and Italy. The treaties 
generally provide assistance in the criminal matters, including assistance in 
locating witnesses, obtaining statements and testimonies of witnesses, pro-
duction and authentication of the business records and service of judicial and 
administrative documents. The major advantage of these treaties is that they 
are binding for the parties in the treaty. 
The other form of agreement on which the United States has relied, in the in-
ternational context, is the Memorandum of Understanding. MOU is non-bind-
ing statement of intent between regulators providing for the exchange of in-
formation and mutual cooperation. The Commission has entered into MOU 
or similar agreements with Switzerland, Japan, the U.K., Brazil, the Canadian 
Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, Italy, the Netherlands, 
France, Mexico, Portugal and Germany. Experience has shown that MOUs 
provide effective means of obtaining information in securities, enforcement 
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and assist in developing a framework for cooperation and improved commu-
nication. 
At home, the United States has passed laws to facilitate its cooperation with 
foreign governments. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988 expanded the Commission’s ability to provide assistance to the 
foreign regulators by allowing them to use their compulsory powers to compel 
testimony and production of documents obtain information at the request of a 
foreign securities authority. 
The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990 enlarged 
the Commission’s ability to address international securities issues in several 
ways. It amended the securities laws to permit the Commission to institute an 
administrative proceeding barring, sanctioning, or otherwise placing condi-
tions on a securities professional’s ability to engage in Commission-regulated 
activities if a foreign court or securities authority has found that the profession-
al engaged in illegal or improper conduct. The law also amended the securities 
laws in order to provide confi dential treatment for records produced under 
reciprocal arrangement with foreign securities authorities by exempting the 
documents from the disclosure obligation of the Freedom of Information Act if 
a good faith representation is made that disclosure would violate that country’s 
confi dentiality requirements. In addition, the law makes explicit the Commis-
sion’s rulemaking authority to provide access to non-public documents and 
other information to both foreign and domestic authorities. Finally, it authoriz-
es the Commission to accept reimbursement from a foreign securities authori-
ty for expenses incurred by the Commission in providing assistance. 
In 1997, the SEC made 240 requests to the foreign governments for enforce-
ment assistance and responded to 363 requests for enforcement assistance 
from the foreign governments14.
In the summer of 1998, the SEC had notable success in obtaining information 
under the Hague Convention, which prescribes certain procedures by which 
a judicial authority in one contracting state may request evidence located in 
another contracting state in civil cases15. In an emergency action fi led in the 
Southern District of New York, the Commission fi led complaint against two 
Singapore residents, alleging that the defendants engaged in insider trading 
prior to the public announcement that APL Limited would be acquired by Sin-
gapore-based Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd. The court granted the Commission’s 
14   Martinson Jane, Powers Against Crime Will Refl ect SEC’s Sanctions, The Financial Times 
(London), July 31, 1998, at 11.
15  The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
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request for a temporary asset freeze and orders requiring the defendants to 
identify themselves, allowing expedited discovery, and granting other ancil-
lary relief16.
The Commission applied to the High Court of the Republic of Singapore under 
the Hague Convention for the appointment of an examiner to take evidence 
from witnesses in Singapore, to be used in the proceeding in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. The Singaporean defendants opposed the appointment of 
an examiner, arguing that despite the U.S. classifi cation of the action as civil, 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are penal in nature and, therefore, 
the Hague Convention does not apply. The Singapore court held for the SEC, 
fi nding that an action for an injunction under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is a 
civil proceeding according to the law of the United States and the law of Sin-
gapore. This decision, if followed in other Hague signatory countries, opens 
yet another mode of international information-gathering available to the SEC’s 
enforcement program. 
8. CONCLUSION
The European Union has formally recognized the importance of insider trad-
ing prohibitions by passing directive requiring its members to adopt insider 
trading legislation. The preamble to the directive stresses the economic impor-
tance of a healthy securities market, recognizes that maintaining healthy mar-
kets requires investor confi dence and acknowledges that investor confi dence 
depends on the “assurance afforded to investors that they are placed on an 
equal footing and that they will be protected against the improper use of inside 
information.”17 These precepts echo around the world as reports of increased 
insider trading regulation and enforcement efforts are daily news.
The EC has accomplished something that the U.S. Congress has not been able 
to accomplish. By defi ning specifi cally the persons and transactions covered 
by insider trading prohibitions, the EC Directive provides certainty in the rule 
of law not found in the United States counterpart. Interestingly, much of the 
theory underlying the EC Directive was adopted from the United States case 
law. Congress should follow the EC approach and codify the law, thereby pro-
viding needed certainty and coherence.
16  SEC v. One Unknown Purchaser of the Call Options of APL Limited and Ong Congqin 
Bobby, 97 Civ. 2664 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 1997), Litig. Rel. No. 15334.
17  Council Directive 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, 1 Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH)
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In conclusion, it should be noted that the effectiveness of legislation govern-
ing insider activity, primarily due to the goals that were set by the legislator 
after his admission. The mere existence of such legislation does not guarantee 
unconditional increase in investment activity and improve the liquidity of the 
fi nancial markets, while protecting the rights of investors and a level playing 
fi eld in the fi nancial market will contribute to its development.
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